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[Two categories of criticism have recently been marshalled against Lockean 
copyright theory. Some argue that Locke’s property theory offers no justifi-
cation for intellectual property rights at all, while others suggest that 
Lockean rights in intellectual property are too strong. This article responds 
to each of these criticisms by offering a new Lockean approach to copyright 
that balances property rights for producers and fair use rights for the public. 
The approach relies most strongly on Locke’s State of Nature/ Civil Society 
distinction and his dual concern for public and private rights.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION  
As technology advances and the value of intellectual property increases exponen-
tially, society is faced with difficult practical questions regarding the regulation of 
intellectual property rights.  As these questions multiply, solving them on an ad hoc 
basis becomes more and more difficult, and so the search for theoretical founda-
tions for intellectual property rights is on in earnest: by defining theoretical bounda-
ries, we equip ourselves for emerging practical questions. In this paper, I advocate a 
distinctly Lockean approach to copyright law.  I argue that Lockean copyright has 
the potential to be not only viable but also valuable. 
Locke’s property theory, from his Second Treatise of Government1 is a good source 
to draw from because it appeals to our moral intuitions in that it simultaneously 
respects public and private property rights.  It is based on an initial common owner-
ship of resources, and labourers gain private property rights in the fruits of their 
labour.  This makes sense: no one ought to have preordained private rights in raw 
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materials, but individuals ought to earn property by working.  Locke’s work appeals 
both to moral intuition and to common sense, so it is hardly surprising that his 
property theory is adaptable to copyright. 
Looking to Locke as a foundation for copyright is nothing new.2  But recently, 
critics have argued that Lockean intellectual property theory is untenable.3  Some 
suggest that a Lockean approach is self-contradictory.  They argue that privatizing 
intellectual products undermines Locke’s concern for public rights.  Others accept 
its viability while rejecting it on normative grounds.  These critics suggest that 
Lockean copyright is so strong as to preclude fair use, which is an essential part of 
good copyright law. 
The aim of this paper is to present one cogent approach to Lockean copyright that 
resolves these relevant issues.  That is, my approach will respond to the two main 
criticisms of Lockean theories by providing a viable Lockean framework for private 
copyrights while preserving the public’s right to fair use.  I do not argue that mine 
is the only way to solve the problems posed by critics of Locke.  It is a sufficient 
response to the criticisms of Lockean copyright to show that there is at least one 
coherent Lockean approach that grants copyrights to producers while preserving the 
common sense fair use rights of consumers. 
My approach relies most heavily on two aspects of Locke’s text: 1) the distinction 
between the state of nature and civil society and 2) Locke’s dual concern for public 
and private rights.  The complex relationship in Locke’s texts between natural and 
civil law will help respond to those critics who question the viability of a Lockean 
approach to copyright, while Locke’s dual concern for public and private rights will 
be instrumental in aligning fair use with Lockean copyright. 
In section II, I lay the groundwork for discussion, addressing intellectual property 
generally.  In section III, I set out the basic features of Locke’s property theory.  In 
section IV, I turn to the critics, summarizing the criticisms marshalled against 
Lockean intellectual property theory and identifying how these criticisms still leave 
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room for a new approach.  In section V, I build a Lockean theory that allows for fair 
use, followed by some concluding remarks in section VI.   
II INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY 
Before turning to Locke to initiate a discussion of Lockean copyright, I will address 
intellectual property in general, both to clarify how I use certain terms as well as to 
locate this project within the scope of the field.   
There are many differences between intellectual products and tangibles ones.  For 
example, while there is only one Statue of Liberty, any online digital music store 
can sell you the exact same digital copy of “Let It Be.”  If someone made a copy of 
the Statue of Liberty, it would not be the same as the original.  But you can burn 
thirty copies of “Let It Be” and give them to your friends with no loss of quality.  
Also, identifying exactly what an intellectual property right in “Let It Be” consists 
in is more complicated than dealing with statues.  It is hard enough to identify 
exactly what the intellectual product is. 
Because an infinite number of people can simultaneously use and enjoy an intellec-
tual product without diminishing its usefulness, intellectual property is nonrival-
rous.  Thomas Jefferson provides a useful analogy for this quality: “He who 
receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he 
who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”4  That intellec-
tual property is nonrivalrous raises a question as to whether governments should 
grant private intellectual property rights at all.  Rather than arguing over who owns 
a certain song, we could just as easily just go home and listen to it.  But our society 
values intellectual property, so we need to examine such rights carefully. 
Intellectual property comprises four distinct parts: patent, copyright, trademark, and 
trade secret.  In this paper, I focus on copyright, though I suspect that at least some 
of my Lockean copyright theory would adapt to patent as well.  US copyright law 
protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion.”5  Though it protects expressions of ideas, it does not protect ideas them-
selves.6  Owners of copyright have the exclusive right to reproduce, perform, 
display or transmit their work.7 
But this exclusive right does not preclude all public uses of a given work.  The 
public has a right to fair use of copyrighted works, which allows for: 
[The] use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in 
copies or phonorecords…for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching…scholarship, or research.8 
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The fair use doctrine gives the public access to products that they do not own.  In 
doing so, the fair use doctrine limits private intellectual property rights.  Were it not 
for fair use, I might have the right to prohibit negative commentaries of this paper, 
for example- at least those that use my expression to buttress their criticism. 
Fair use is an important part of copyright. Copyright serves “[t]o promote the pro-
gress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inven-
tors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”9  Fair use helps 
to promote this end.  Entire fields, such as film criticism, depend on free access to 
copyrighted materials.  Were it not for fair use, there would be little room for such 
fields.  Because it is so important, any copyright theory that prohibited fair use 
would for that reason be unattractive. 
III LOCKE’S PROPERTY THEORY 
In this section, I provide a basic outline of Locke’s property theory in order to distil 
those elements that are most fundamentally Lockean from Locke’s text.  These 
elements provide the framework for my Lockean copyright theory.  I begin, as 
Locke does, in the state of nature, explaining how civil society is built out of natural 
law.  Then, I distinguish two main aspects of Locke’s property theory: the natural 
law justification for property rights and the mechanism through which property 
rights are attained.  I explain why the natural law justification is not essential to a 
discussion of copyright in civil society.  Then I focus on Locke’s appropriation 
mechanism, which provides the main framework for my Lockean copyright theory.  
The appropriation mechanism involves consideration of the natural common, la-
bour-desert property rights, and limits on the acquisition of private property.  Fi-
nally, I discuss Locke’s underlying dual concern for public and private rights. 
Before discussing Locke’s theory, I should clarify some key terms to avoid confu-
sion.  By appropriation, I do not mean merely the act of obtaining a given good.  
Instead, appropriation is the process by which one gains property rights in a good.  
What exactly such property rights ought to consist in—according to Locke or 
otherwise—is an important question.  But since it is a complex issue in itself that is 
not at the core of this project, I will offer a very basic account.10  A property right 
in a product includes the right to exclude others from using or accessing that prod-
uct without consent of the owner.  Further, property rights allow owners to make 
any use of a given product that they please, provided that their use does not harm 
others.  This account of what property rights consist in is incomplete, but it should 
provide the framework for understanding the core of this project. 
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A The State of Nature and Civil Society 
Locke’s Second Treatise begins in the state of nature, which he describes as a 
“State of perfect Freedom.”11  In this state, there is no government to regulate one’s 
actions, and there is no system that judges or punishes.  Each person has an equal 
right to carry out the mandates of the state of nature.12  Locke uses this state as a 
vehicle for his discussion of natural law: even where there is no government, natu-
ral law still applies.13  Natural law is the law of reason, which commands that “no 
one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”14  Natural 
law also allows for property rights: ownership does not require a deed. 
Natural law informs and limits the scope of civil law—that is why Locke starts a 
treatise of government with the state of nature.  He begins his discussion by saying, 
“To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must 
consider what State all Men are naturally in.”15  But natural law is much more than 
a precursor to civil law.  Locke later states: 
The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in society, but only in 
many Cases are drawn closer, and have by Humane Laws known Penalties 
annexed to them, to enforce their observation.16 
So the state of nature is much more than some mythical forebear to civil society.  
Instead, it provides the natural law framework that governments must abide. 
At the same time, civil law need not be identical to natural law. While legislation is 
always bound by natural law, civil law goes beyond natural law in some important 
ways.  In the state of nature, for example, there are no impartial judges to resolve 
disputes. This is one reason why people form societies.17 Society can set up a judi-
cial system.  Society can produce innumerable laws, provided that they are for the 
“public good of Society.”18  So even if copyright is not part of Locke’s natural law 
framework, it still can be part of civil society. 
B  Natural Law Justification for Private Property Rights 
Locke’s property theory comprises two parts.  The first is his natural law justifica-
tion for private property rights. All the resources of the world are initially the com-
mon property of humanity.19  Private appropriation occurs at the expense of the 
common, and so the question is this: how does one justify, in the state of nature, 
private property at the expense of the public’s initial common ownership? 
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Locke provides several answers to this question.20  These justifications apply to the 
state of nature: they explain how, without any form of society or civil law, one 
justifies private property rights. If a government already recognizes the utility or 
necessity of property rights, irrespective of natural law considerations, one need not 
justify such rights.  Locke’s natural law justification for private property plays an 
important role within his theory, particularly as it responds to the work of his con-
temporary Robert Filmer.21 But I am not interested here in discussing whether 
copyrights should exist at all, so justification is beyond the scope of this project.  
C The Lockean Appropriation Mechanism 
The second part of Locke’s property theory is his mechanism for the appropriation 
of goods held in common.  This mechanism responds to the practical question of 
how one earns a private property right in goods taken from the common.  The 
mechanism consists of three parts: 1) the common, 2) a labour-desert appropriation 
scheme for drawing from the common, and 3) limits on what one can take from the 
common. 
The first part of Locke’s mechanism is the natural common.  For Locke, “The 
Earth, and all that is therein, is given to Men for the Support and Comfort of their 
Being.”22 The natural common is the entire world of unappropriated materials.  
These unappropriated materials are the resources of the world in their natural state.  
The common was given to humanity “for their benefit, and the greatest Conven-
iences of Life they were capable to draw from it.”23  So while the common is the 
property of humanity, it is meant to be used. 
The second part of the appropriation mechanism is labour-desert appropriation.  
One must labour in order to appropriate some part of the common.  Locke describes 
appropriation in this way: 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, 
and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.24 
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In labouring, one distinguishes particular goods from the common and gains prop-
erty rights in those goods.  This is why Locke’s theory is called a “labour-desert” 
theory of property: one is justly rewarded for labouring,   
The passage above reveals not only the sufficient condition for appropriation, but 
also what Locke means by “labour.”  Labour is the activity of removing something 
out of its natural state and distinguishing it from the common.  Locke later adds 
“[t]hat labour put a distinction between them [appropriated goods] and the com-
mon.”25  Labour is merely the process of putting a distinction on particular goods.  
If you remove something from its natural state, then you have laboured, and your 
labour is rewarded with property rights in that thing. 
The third part of Locke’s appropriation mechanism is the set of limits on appropria-
tion.  It may be objected that, under Locke’s mechanism, “any one may ingross as 
much as he will.”26  Locke provides two limits in response to this objection: the 
spoilage proviso and the “enough and as good” proviso. 
Locke’s spoilage proviso mandates that one may not have property rights in excess 
of that which he can use before spoilage.  The basic argument is that one should not 
be wasteful at the expense of others. This is how Locke describes the limit of ap-
propriation: 
As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it 
spoils; so much may he by his labour fix a Property in.  Whatever is be-
yond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.27 
This limit on appropriation is called the spoilage proviso because it requires that 
appropriated goods are used before they spoil.  The spoilage proviso says that it is 
wrong to hoard up millions of apples while your neighbour starves, and Locke’s 
property theory does not recognize property rights in those apples that you cannot 
use before they spoil. 
Locke’s “enough and as good” proviso limits appropriation by requiring that the 
common not be overly depleted.  Locke does not explicitly state this as a proviso, 
but it emerges from the following: 
For this Labour being the unquestionable property of the Labourer, no Man 
but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is 
enough, and as good left in common for others.28 
One can appropriate as much as she likes, so long as she does not leave the com-
mon depleted beyond this “enough and as good” standard.29  “Enough and as good” 
is a two part proviso.  The “enough” requires that labourers not overly deplete the 
common quantitatively—one must not take so much that there is too little left for 
others.  The “as good” part is a qualitative measure that prohibits labourers from 
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justly appropriating all the best resources, leaving the common with lesser materi-
als. 
The specifics of these limits are not as important as the more general descriptive 
point: Locke’s theory limits private appropriation.  In limiting private appropriation, 
Locke reveals his concern for the public’s right to a common.  The common ought 
to provide sufficient resources for humanity.  That there are limits is more signifi-
cant than the specific limits themselves because it is unlikely that the specific limits 
can easily be adapted to an intellectual property theory.  Tangible goods are very 
different from intellectual products.  Therefore, it is unlikely that limits specifically 
conceived for tangible goods will be adaptable to the complexities of intellectual 
property.  But the general concern can be adapted: appropriation ought to be limited 
in order to preserve a robust common. 
In summary, Locke’s appropriation mechanism comprises three parts: the common, 
labour-desert appropriation, and limits on appropriation.  The world of resources is 
shared in a common, but by labouring we individually appropriate goods from the 
common.  This labour is an act of distinguishing part of the common—which be-
comes one’s property—from the resources that continue to be held in common.  
Various provisos limit our appropriation so that we do not overly deplete the com-
mon 
Locke’s mechanism embraces a dual concern for the private rights of the individual 
in property and the public rights in a natural common of resources.  The mechanism 
accounts for private rights by providing individuals access to the common and a 
way to appropriate goods from the common.  At the same time, it accounts for 
public rights by granting equal ownership of the common and limiting private 
appropriation so as to not encroach too far on public rights.  This dual concern is 
fundamental in Locke’s text, and therefore it should be a basic consideration in 
developing a Lockean intellectual property theory. 
 
IV APPARENT SHORTCOMINGS OF 
     LOCKEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY 
 
In this section, I outline the dominant criticisms of Lockean intellectual property 
theory.  The criticisms generally fall into two categories.  The first category of 
criticism focuses on the weakness of any Lockean intellectual property theory.  The 
basic premise is that there is no way to overcome certain aspects of Locke’s text 
that render a Lockean approach to intellectual property weak or impossible.  The 
second category of criticism focuses on the strength of Lockean theory.  This view 
is that Locke’s text provides a foundation for individual property rights that is so 
strong as to cripple the public’s right in a robust intellectual common.  I show each 
of these sets of criticism is more directly attached to Locke’s text than to Lockean 
copyright in general.  As a result, they leave room for a new approach to Lockean 
copyright. 
One suggested hurdle for Lockean theory is that it cannot be applied to intellectual 
products because Locke’s interest in the public right to a robust common outweighs 
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potential private intellectual property rights.  This perspective emerges out of an 
awareness of the nonrivalrous character of intellectual property: intellectual prod-
ucts can be used without being individually appropriated because we do not need a 
property right to use any intellectual products that are necessary for our subsistence.  
Therefore we do not need a property right to use any intellectual products that are 
necessary for our subsistence.  Granting intellectual property rights, while unneces-
sary for subsistence, can potentially diminish common resources, so such rights 
cause a net loss in public resources.  And since they are unnecessary, they are 
unjustified.  The Lockean theorist must seek out other theoretical foundations for 
intellectual property. 
Seana Shiffrin argues that Locke’s strong focus on public rights precludes anything 
more than weak private intellectual property rights.30  Due to the lack of natural law 
justification for intellectual property, she concludes, “The place of common owner-
ship in Locke’s scheme cuts against the argument for private ownership of intellec-
tual property.”31  Shiffrin argues that the “fully effective use of an idea…generally 
does not require, by its nature, prolonged exclusive use or control.”32  Since one 
need not appropriate intellectual products in order to effectively use them, Locke’s 
natural law justification for property rights does not apply to intellectual products.  
As a result, copyright cannot be part of a Lockean framework. 
There is a solution to the problem that Shiffrin’s reading poses, however.  The 
solution lies in the complexities of Locke’s text.  One could grant that the state of 
nature does not provide apparent justification for copyright and still embrace copy-
right in civil society. If a government recognizes copyright as good for society, then 
it can legislate to protect copyright.  While the use of an intellectual product may 
not require appropriation, there may be some reason other than necessity to justify 
copyright as good for society. 
The text leaves room for other responses to Shiffrin as well.  Her interpretation 
focuses on just one of Locke’s natural law justifications for private property, 
namely the “necessary-for-use” justification, which justifies appropriation through 
necessity.33  Many argue that the necessary-for-use justification is not even the most 
significant one.34 Lockean theory is often called labour-desert theory for a reason—
Locke justifies property rights as a deserved reward for labourers.  Shiffrin is aware 
that she is in the minority when she suggests, “Labour plays a subsidiary role [in 
Lockean property theory.]”35  What she means here is that labour identifies, but 
does not justify, property claims. Labour is only the mechanism by which, for 
example, Bob’s property (which he owns merely out of necessity) is distinguished 
from Otto’s (also of necessity).  If Shiffrin had not thus reduced the role of labour 
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in her interpretation of Lockean theory, she would not have been so successful in 
limiting private rights that intellectual property rights disappeared.   
A third way to respond to Shiffrin’s indictment of Lockean intellectual property 
theory is to cite Locke’s dual concern for the individual and the public.  Locke’s 
text is simultaneously focused on the rights of humanity and on the rights of each 
individual person.  For Locke, individual rights are not merely unfortunate necessi-
ties, but instead are naturally bestowed upon each person in the same way that the 
natural common is given to all persons.  Locke suggests that society helps to ensure 
our private rights, saying “The great and chief end…of Men uniting into Common-
wealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of Prop-
erty.”36 While Locke is committed to private property rights in various ways, 
Shiffrin overly emphasizes ownership and public rights at the expense of the indi-
vidual. 
William Fisher presents a different type of argument against the viability of a 
Lockean approach to intellectual property theory.37  He claims that “it is not alto-
gether clear that the labour theory supports any sort of intellectual-property law,” 
citing textual ambiguities as the source of the problem.38 For example, Fisher lists 
six different justifications for property rights from Locke’s text, and he argues that 
“whether Locke’s theory provides support for intellectual property depends on 
which of these various rationales one regards as primary.”39  His argument, then, is 
this. Locke provides several different justifications for property. The different 
justifications can lead in different directions.  These different directions represent a 
problem for Lockean theory because they would produce an approach to intellectual 
property law that is so ambiguous as to be useless. A well-formed approach is 
necessarily as precise as possible because imprecision can lead either to conflicting 
policies or to no foundation for policies at all. Therefore, Lockean intellectual 
property theory is crippled by ambiguity.  From the ambiguities that Fisher identi-
fies, he infers that the choices we make in our approach to Lockean intellectual 
property theory, “will often make a big difference.”40 And since Locke’s text pro-
vides no unequivocal foundation, it cannot produce a viable approach to intellectual 
property. 
While I agree that Locke is often ambiguous, that does not imply that the ambigui-
ties in Locke’s text stop us from producing a viable Lockean intellectual property 
theory.  Fisher’s claim is that the interpretations one chooses for what counts as 
labour and what constitutes the intellectual common matter.  This is true.  But 
ambiguity alone does not destroy Lockean copyright theory.  There are numerous 
examples of theories that are ambiguous that nevertheless produce viable solutions 
to complex problems. Take, for example, a basic account of retributive punishment.  
Advocating that criminals be punished in order to “repay” their crimes proportion-
ally according to severity is an ambiguous policy.  One might ask, how much does a 
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criminal “owe” for any given crime?  An advocate of retributive justice could give 
many different accounts of how much a criminal owes society, and it does make a 
difference which account one chooses.  But retributive punishment is still a viable 
option for dealing with criminals despite its ambiguity. One merely needs to choose 
which account she wants to adopt.  Fisher’s argument raises an important point: the 
Lockean intellectual property theorist has some important decisions to make.  But 
there is still room to make those decisions. 
Fortunately, the ambiguity in Locke is not as bad as it could be.  If Lockean theory 
were so ambiguous as to be completely uninformative, then that would render it 
practically useless as an approach to copyright. But Fisher insists the opposite, in 
asserting that the theory has too many practical consequences.  His argument is that 
the myriad practical consequences are themselves inconsistent, or, what is even 
weaker, that people can read the text in many different ways. That people read a 
text in many ways is not a criticism of the text itself, however: it is equally possible 
that the text is fine and all but one reading is wrong. 
In developing a Lockean intellectual property theory, one should be as true as 
possible to that which is most fundamentally Lockean while structuring the roles of 
labour and the common in the most desirable way.  Any problems in Locke’s text 
are both immaterial and unsurprising. They are immaterial because Lockean prop-
erty theory is distinct from Locke’s text. They are unsurprising because Locke does 
not specifically address intellectual property at any point in his Two Treatises.   
While both Shiffrin and Fisher highlight important concerns, their arguments do not 
put an end to the project of Lockean copyright. Shiffrin’s reading highlights the 
common. And this is important: a copyright theory is not Lockean unless it presup-
poses a natural intellectual common.  Fisher cites the difficult choices one must 
make within a Lockean framework. Indeed there are choices that one must make, 
and indeed I will do so in what follows. 
The second category of criticism of Lockean intellectual property theory emerges 
out of a concern for fair use. Scholars fear that Lockean theory rewards the intellec-
tual labourer with property rights that are too exclusive. They suggest that any 
reasonable intellectual property theory should protect the public’s right to quote 
from, parody, or criticize an intellectual product, and they argue that Locke’s theory 
grants private rights that are so strong as to preclude such public uses.  But though 
these concerns have a distinct presence in the literature, it is difficult to find them 
fully articulated by anyone. 
The absence of developed arguments against Lockean copyright theory on fair use 
grounds is indicative of the inherent weakness of this line of criticism.  It is difficult 
to find a scholar who devotes any substantial effort to supporting the position that 
Lockean theory overly limits fair use: instead, one finds some who respond to this 
apparent problem and others who accept the problem as a given.  The general fear 
of a diminishing common is a real one, and it is most notably articulated by Robert 
Nozick, who is concerned that Lockean theory might give the ocean to anyone with 
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a can of tomato juice.41  But Lockean theory does not necessitate such absurd priva-
tization, and Nozick’s concern is not that the tomato juice problem renders Lockean 
theory untenable.  Instead, Nozick tries to provide his own Lockean property theory 
that passes the tomato juice test. Still, many have used Nozick to fuel their Lockean 
criticisms. 
David McGowan does a good job of characterizing these criticisms of Locke, 
though he is not an advocate of them. 42  He poses the problem this way:  
If I am right to say that Lockean theory justifies granting authors the right 
to exclude others from their works, then…it is very hard to square existing 
fair use rights, or any other set of fair use rights, with Lockean theory. That 
is troubling, because my hunch is that some level of fair use rights in-
creases welfare, meaning that a pure Lockean copyright would impose 
welfare losses.43 
McGowan is not really outlining the argument that Lockean theory does not allow 
for fair use—he is just explaining that it seems like Lockean theory has this prob-
lem, and that such a problem is “troubling.”  The implied argument runs like this: 
Lockean theory justifies the right to exclude others from using a privately owned 
intellectual product.  Excluding others implies excluding what we consider fair uses 
of a product. Thus, Lockean theory does not allow for fair use.  The form of the 
argument appears to be valid, and it is supported by Locke’s text in that Lockean 
property rights appear to justify excluding others from one’s property. 
Fortunately, Locke’s property theory is not as rigid as this argument makes it out to 
be.  The relationship between the state of nature and civil society is evidence of its 
pliability.  In the state of nature, one has an exclusive right to one’s own land—she 
can keep all others off it and even punish trespassers.  But a civil society can deem 
it in the best interests of society that some people have access to her land even 
without her consent. For example, society might create a law that allows police 
officers to follow criminals onto her land in order to ensure the safety of society.  
This is not part of natural law, but, beyond making intuitive sense, this is part of 
Lockean property theory.  Lockean civil society is structured so that each person 
“authorizes the Society…to make Laws for him as the Publick good of the Society 
shall require.”44 If the public good justifies limiting the exclusivity of property 
rights in civil society, then we need not rigidly adhere to that aspect of natural law. 
Fair use might limit the scope of copyright, but if it limits it for the good of society, 
then it accords with Lockean theory. 
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Both categories of criticism—that a Lockean approach is incongruous with intellec-
tual property and that such an approach leaves no room for fair use—highlight 
some important concerns for the Lockean intellectual property theorist.  But neither 
category eliminates the possibility of Lockean copyright. Those critics that chal-
lenge the viability of Lockean theory remind the intellectual property theorist that 
initial common ownership is essential to Lockean copyright. Those that reject 
Lockean copyright because they fear it is too strong highlight the importance of fair 
use. By drawing on these criticisms, one can create an informed, attractive approach 
to Lockean copyright. 
 
V CONSTRUCTING A LOCKEAN THEORY THAT  
                         LEAVES ROOM FOR FAIR USE 
 
In this section, I provide a new framework for Lockean intellectual property theory. 
This framework relies on the fundamental Lockean dual concern for the individual 
and the public and the basic structure of Locke’s property theory. I develop a 
Lockean approach to the seemingly intractable issues in intellectual property the-
ory: the intellectual common, appropriation, and limits on appropriation.  By ad-
vancing a framework that is sensitive to the differences between tangible and 
intellectual products, while maintaining Lockean commitments, I thus demonstrate 
the viability of a Lockean approach to copyright. 
Locke’s property theory begins with the natural common. The common is the entire 
world of resources in their natural state.  The common is significant because, rather 
than being given as a divine right to a few individuals, it is a world of resources 
owned by humanity in common.  By building his property theory upon a natural 
common, Locke deemphasizes individual rights and recognizes public rights.  The 
role of the common within Locke’s theory is that of a universal baseline: we all 
start off with the equal property rights in the world.  Individual property rights are 
then gained through rightful acts of appropriation, but everyone has an equal innate 
claim to the world. 
Locke’s common does not appear to be easily adaptable to an intellectual property 
theory.  The difficulty lies in the ontology of intellectual products.  While the natu-
ral resources from which a tangible good is produced are identifiable, it is much 
more difficult to discern the resources from which an intellectual product is pro-
duced.  For example, what are the resources from which Beethoven’s Symphony 
No. 5 was produced?  There are innumerable answers to this question.45  There are 
the technical answers: a particular set of motives and chord progressions, the sym-
phonic form, or western harmony. But there are also the more romantic answers: 
sounds Beethoven heard in nature, feelings that he had, or his experiences.  None of 
these fully answer the question of natural materials, not in the same way that one 
might be able to answer the question, “Where did this piece of paper come from?”  
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This is because intellectual products are different from tangible goods.  There is no 
apparent set of resources from which intellectual products are produced. 
There are several inadequate ways of thinking about the intellectual common.  For 
example, the common could be the set of all possible intellectual products, or to put 
it another way, any intellectual product or idea that has been or will ever be pro-
duced.  On this perspective, Beethoven’s symphony is merely a product drawn from 
the common.  Beethoven, in some sort of divinely inspired moment, transcribed the 
symphony from the intellectual common to the world.  But this view is unsatisfac-
tory for two reasons.  First, it is contrary to our natural intuitions.  It just does not 
make sense to say that Beethoven’s symphony existed in the intellectual common 
before he produced it.  Second, the common that this view portrays does not really 
resemble the Lockean common, because it is overdeveloped.  The Lockean com-
mon is an uncultivated world rather than a world of infinite cultivated products. 
Another inadequate way of thinking of the Lockean intellectual common is the 
opposite of the first one.  On this view, the intellectual common is empty: all intel-
lectual products come from intellectual resources within the individual himself.  
This avoids the problem of disputes over natural intellectual resources: because 
they come from the individual, no one else any claim to them.  But this view of the 
common is equally untenable.  First, there is not a common if the common is empty.  
The view circumvents the Lockean concern for the public in that it grants no com-
mon resources.  Second, it does not make sense.  Lacking any raw materials from 
which to build intellectual products, producers are left with nothing to produce.  If 
Beethoven had been placed in isolation—from contact with humans as well as 
contact with human culture—he would never have written any symphonies. 
There is a better way to conceive of the intellectual common: the common consists 
of the resources for the production of intellectual products and not the products 
themselves.46  This aligns well with the so-called idea/expression dichotomy.47  The 
ideas that inspire the production of intellectual products are commonly owned, 
whereas the individual expressions—the particular poem, painting, or song—are 
not part of the natural intellectual common. 
This conception of the common embraces Locke’s dual concern for private and 
public rights.  The public’s right to a common is met with a robust set of intellectual 
resources: anyone can access forms, languages, and general ideas. No one can 
hinder this natural right.  At the same time, this concept preserves private rights in 
that intellectual products are subject to property rights.  So while you cannot own 
the English language, you can own a work written in that language.  This arrange-
ment accounts for both private and public rights. 
Some might object that this conception of the intellectual common cannot be ap-
plied in practice because the idea/expression dichotomy is not always clear. In most 
cases, however, it will be easy to distinguish ideas from expressions. And if a 
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product is an expression, then it is not part of the intellectual common.  Sometimes 
it might be hard to tell the extent to which an intellectual product is actually an 
expression rather than merely an idea.  For example, consider a musician who 
records a single note—with nothing distinct about it—on the piano.  The note itself 
is part of the intellectual common: it is a raw material that, combined with other 
materials, musicians use to create unique expressions.  But at the same time, this 
particular musician used this note alone to express herself.  The idea/expression 
dichotomy seems to blur.  This is a hard case, but my framework is not designed to 
solve all the hard cases.  Instead, it should provide a general normative framework 
for deliberation.  It is even advantageous that this framework does not solve all the 
hard cases: it leaves room for an analysis of the complexities of individual cases 
instead of mandating adherence to a set of inflexible rules. 
Others might argue that this conception works, but it is not worth adopting because 
it does not provide sufficient public intellectual materials.  But this conception 
gives the public plenty of resources.  Of course, we are given basic materials such 
as language and forms, but we also can use as resources any intellectual materials 
except particular expressions.  So we can be inspired by, or create in a similar style 
as, anyone and anything at all.  The only thing we are deprived of is the unhindered 
ability to use the particular expressions themselves as materials for the creation of 
intellectual products.  Thus, this conception of the intellectual common is rich with 
resources. 
There are some consequences of adopting this conception of the common.  First, no 
one has a greater natural claim to ideas than anyone else.  No one can justly claim 
natural property rights in the idea of a love song, for example.  Even if we could 
identify the inventor of the love song as a category, that person would not have an 
intellectual property right in the idea of a love song.  The idea of a love song does 
not meet the threshold for assigning property rights. And it shouldn’t: we do not 
tend to think that any individual or group should be privileged with respect to 
access to forms of intellectual expression and the like. 
A second consequence of this conception of the intellectual common is that particu-
lar expressions are subject to private ownership.  While he may not own the general 
form of reality television or the idea of having a show about a job competition, 
Donald Trump can own the rights to The Apprentice, his own particular intellectual 
product.  And he should.  The show is a unique expression of the idea of a competi-
tive reality show. This coheres with out moral intuition that when someone is re-
sponsible for the creation of a particular product, that person ought to own the 
product of his labour. 
The best way to conceive of the intellectual common, then, is to view it as compris-
ing the ideas rather than particular expressions.  Ideas are not naturally subject to 
private property rights.  Expressions, or intellectual products, are subject to such 
rights. This view embraces Locke’s dual concern for public and private. Also, while 
appropriation is not at issue here, this conception of the common leaves room for 
private ownership of intellectual products, since the common is limited to ideas and 
does not include particular expressions. 
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Locke’s mechanism for appropriation is built upon labour-desert.  The labourer is 
rewarded with property rights in the fruits of her labour.  Lockean “labour” is best 
understood as any activity with a distinguishing function, rather than in the more 
everyday sense of the word “labour.”  That is, labour is the act by which one distin-
guishes a particular good or set of goods from the natural common.  By defining 
Lockean labour in this way, one alleviates the problem of what qualifies as labour.  
Any act can be considered labour, so long as it distinguishes goods from the com-
mon. 
Critics have been sceptical as to whether a Lockean labour-desert theory could 
possibly be adapted to an intellectual property theory.  One problem, they say, is 
that the idea of “labour” does not seem to apply in the same way to writing poetry 
as it does to ploughing.  Also, some suggest that appropriating intellectual products 
goes against Locke’s concern for the public: they say that such appropriation is 
needless and does the public harm.  But both of these sets of criticism overlook the 
flexibility of Lockean intellectual property theory as well as its fundamental con-
cerns.  There is a way to conceive of a Lockean labour-desert mechanism for the 
appropriation of intellectual products from the common. 
This view of labour as a distinguishing function, while allowing for the appropria-
tion of expressions, precludes the direct appropriation of ideas and intellectual 
resources from the common.  This is important: were intellectual labourers able to 
appropriate ideas themselves, the intellectual common might become overly de-
pleted. But one need not worry about that within a Lockean framework because any 
attempt to appropriate ideas from the common will fail to count as labor- labor 
requires sufficient distinction of an expression form the intellectual common of 
ideas. For example, if someone tried to appropriate the musical form of the Blues, 
then a Lockean labour-desert scheme would require that she sufficiently distinguish 
her appropriated product from the intellectual common.  But since the form of the 
Blues is part of the common, then the form itself cannot be distinguished from the 
common. As a result, the Blues cannot be appropriated. 
The intellectual labour that produces an expression can be rewarded with property 
rights in that expression.  As long as the labour sufficiently distinguishes48 a par-
ticular expression from the intellectual common, that expression becomes the prop-
erty of the intellectual labourer.  So if someone paints a portrait, then she is 
rewarded with property rights in her product, the portrait.  She does not come to 
own the idea of painting a portrait, nor the idea of using particular materials to 
create a portrait. 
The view of labour as that which distinguishes particular goods from the common 
allows multiple people to independently appropriate very similar or even identical 
goods from the common.  Appropriation does not require that one distinguish her 
expression from other expressions, but only that she distinguish her product from 
the common.  This may seem to be an odd consequence, but it fits squarely with 
U.S. copyright law. In America, if two songwriters independently draw from the 
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intellectual common to write two identical songs, them each artist gains a property 
right in his work. Thus Lockean labor-desert, defines as I have defined it, conforms 
to this interesting aspect of existing copyright law.  
Shiffrin contends that a Lockean framework prohibits such strong private intellec-
tual property rights because they undermine Locke’s concern for the rights of 
humanity.49  Even if one accepts that Locke’s concern for humanity outweighs his 
concern for the individual, this objection is still vulnerable to criticism.  To restrict 
private property intellectual property rights would actually be self-undermining if 
one takes the Locke’s concern for humanity to be the fundamental Lockean con-
cern.  Without private intellectual property rights, creators might not devote as 
much effort to creating intellectual products.  This is admittedly an instrumentalist 
concern, but it is valid here because of the nature of the intellectual common.  
Common resources are themselves enriched as creators work to produce intellectual 
products.   
There are numerous examples of copyrighted works that enriched, rather than 
diminished, the resources available to society.  Take Nirvana’s “Smells Like Teen 
Spirit” for example.  By labouring to write and record that song, Nirvana rightfully 
gained property rights in it.  No one could use that song without the permission of 
the group.  But that did not preclude others from being influenced or inspired by it.  
Without Nirvana, the early-nineties explosion of grunge music would likely never 
have occurred.  Nirvana helped to inspire a new movement in popular music, de-
spite being granted exclusive copyrights in their music. 
Locke’s property theory has limits on appropriation such as the spoilage proviso 
and the “enough and as good” proviso to ensure that the common will not be overly 
depleted.  Lockean intellectual property theory also needs limits. Allowing for 
perpetually inviolable property rights in intellectual products is not only counterin-
tuitive but also potentially harmful.  It is counterintuitive because humanity would 
be completely excluded from using intellectual products created in the distant past, 
and we would have to pay royalties for practically everything.  It is potentially 
harmful insofar as society would not have access to certain intellectual products that 
would benefit society even when such exclusion no longer benefits the owner of 
such products.  For example, if someone today created a vaccine for an infectious 
disease, that person would rightfully own her product.  But in two-hundred years, 
society might have a need to distribute it without being able to get her permission.  
Perpetually inviolable intellectual property rights would not allow for unlicensed 
distribution. 
But Lockean limits appear to be the most difficult aspect of Locke’s property theory 
to adapt to intellectual products.  This is because neither of Locke’s provisos can 
limit intellectual property rights.  The spoilage proviso fails because it depends on 
the natural process of spoilage.  Locke explains that some goods are not limited by 
the spoilage proviso: for example diamonds.50  Intellectual products, like diamonds, 
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do not spoil in the same way that an apple does.  In fact, intellectual products are 
perpetually durable.  Thus, the spoilage proviso cannot provide a substantive limit 
on intellectual property rights. 
And the “enough and as good” proviso does not limit intellectual property rights 
either.  This proviso has two parts.  The first is quantitative: one must leave enough 
of the resources behind in the common.  The second is qualitative: one must not 
take the best resources and leave humanity with those that are not as good.  But if 
an intellectual labourer is only rewarded with property rights in his product—the 
expression—and not some part of the common—the ideas—then the common is 
never depleted either quantitatively or qualitatively.  The creation and appropriation 
of an intellectual product can add to but not take away from the intellectual com-
mon, so the “enough and as good proviso” does nothing to limit intellectual prop-
erty rights. 
Some Lockean theorists have tried to solve this problem by creatively adapting 
Locke’s provisos to intellectual property. 51  Their approach to Lockean limits relies 
on new ways of thinking about spoilage or harm to humanity.  They admit that 
Locke’s provisos do not naturally conform to the complexities of intellectual prop-
erty, but instead of giving up the provisos, they change the meanings thereof.  
These creative adaptations are strained.  They are so altered that they hardly resem-
ble Locke’s original provisos.  But if a theorist is creating what amounts to an 
entirely new set of limits, then that theorist need not be tied to Locke’s limits.  One 
can develop a set of new limits that are better equipped to deal with the complexi-
ties of intellectual property, if that is the goal.  One can create such limits in a 
Lockean way by embracing his dual concern for public and private rights. 
Benjamin Damstedt tries to solve the problem of limits with the spoilage proviso.  
Damstedt argues that exclusive private intellectual property rights violate the spoil-
age proviso in that intellectual labourers do not achieve “‘total money substitution,’ 
[i.e.] the conversion into money of all units of a product of labour that an individual 
will not personally use.”52  This requirement of “total money substitution” depends 
on a particular reading of Locke’s spoilage proviso.  Damstedt argues that “the 
waste prohibition requires that each unit be put to some use or sold to retain a 
property right in the good.”53  His reading is not simply that individuals must not 
appropriate more than they can before spoilage, but that any good must be put to 
some fully effective use or converted into money if property rights are to be justi-
fiably maintained.  
There are two problems with Damstedt’s interpretation of the spoilage proviso.  
First, Damstedt uses a much different meaning of “waste” than Locke’s.  He con-
spicuously calls the spoilage proviso the “waste prohibition,” which might make the 
discrepancy less obvious.  Locke’s discussion of spoilage is about the kind of 
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spoilage that organic materials are subject to.  The proviso is not about effective 
use.  That his theory allows for the hoarding up of infinite durable goods is evi-
dence of this.54  Locke’s spoilage proviso allows you to collect all the rocks that 
you want, even if other people want them, too.  Since intellectual products are 
durable in the same way that gold is, Locke’s theory does not require that they be 
converted into money.  Intellectual products might even be able to function as 
money themselves.55  
The second problem with Damstedt’s reading is much more troubling.  By requiring 
that the labourer not only use his product but fully use it, Damstedt creates a rule 
that is impossible to follow in practice.  For intellectual goods, the number of poten-
tial uses of a product is indeterminable and so is the value of such uses to potential 
users.  Therefore one cannot know whether the owner of an intellectual product has 
fully converted enough potential uses into money to satisfy the waste prohibition.  
One could respond by saying that fully converting potential uses of an intellectual 
product into money is impossible.  But on that view, every intellectual property 
owner is constantly violating Damstedt’s waste prohibition. And since Damstedt 
contends that if a property right violates the prohibition, that property right is no 
longer justifiable, no one could justify intellectual property rights at all.  Either 1) 
the prohibition is only occasionally violated, in which case the indeterminable 
nature of fully effective use renders the prohibition inefficacious; or 2) the prohibi-
tion is constantly being violated, in which case there are no justified intellectual 
property rights to limit. 
Wendy Gordon tries to solve the problem of Lockean limits by adapting the 
“enough and as good” proviso to intellectual property theory.  Gordon argues that 
the proviso limits intellectual property rights in this way: 
Creators should have property in their original works, only provided that 
such grant of property does no harm to other persons’ equal abilities to 
create or to draw upon the pre-existing cultural matrix and scientific heri-
tage.56 
Intellectual property rights are justified only if they do not harm other persons’ 
access to the common.  One might object that new expressions never hinder access 
to the common.  But Gordon responds that in order to contribute to one’s culture, 
one needs access to the ever advancing intellectual resources of that culture: 
If there is only one culture…a person who wishes to contribute to it usu-
ally is required to use the tools of that culture.  Giving first creators owner-
ship over any aspect of the culture…may make a later creator less well 
off.57 
Accordingly, intellectual property rights that have the potential to do harm by 
prohibiting the use of necessary cultural tools are not justified. 
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Gordon’s attempt to adapt the “enough and as good” proviso to intellectual property 
theory has two problems of its own.  First, there is a question as to whether the 
types of “harm” she is concerned with are harmful enough to merit consideration.  
She gives the following example: “Some poems, some ideas, some works of art, 
become ‘part of me’ in such a way that if I cannot use them, I feel I am cut off from 
a part of myself.”58  This kind of harm is not similar to the type of harm that not 
sharing food might cause.  And if this type of harm is taken as the standard for 
limiting intellectual property rights, artists would too easily lose their rights when 
their work became “part of” those exposed to it: every time an artwork became 
“part of” someone looking at it, the artist could lose an exclusive right to her paint-
ing.  Further, the ability of an artist to retain her rights in an intellectual product 
would vary inversely as 1) she shares her product with the public and 2) her product 
is susceptible to becoming “part of” those who experience it.  Artists who want to 
retain intellectual property rights would be best served if they simply did not share 
their work, or if their work was less likely to incite deep personal connections.  If 
artists fear that they may be expropriated because of the effect their work has on 
others, they might not produce the same quality of work that they might have oth-
erwise.  As a result, our culture could suffer.  Gordon, who is concerned with the 
richness of our culture, would not want this to happen. 
The second problem with Gordon’s analysis is that her conception of harm does not 
produce significant limits even granting her redefinition of the proviso.  Her reading 
of the proviso requires that everyone have equal access to the “pre-existing cultural 
matrix and scientific heritage.”59  So in order to violate the proviso, a property right 
must somehow hinder access to the common as it was before that property right 
existed.  But the creation and appropriation of a new intellectual expression does 
not affect access to the pre-existing common in any way.  Instead, a new intellectual 
product, which did not exist in the common or otherwise in the world, is created 
and privately owned.  The common may even be enriched by the creation of a new 
form, which is not susceptible to appropriation. 
Both Damstedt and Gordon work to adapt Locke’s own provisos to Lockean intel-
lectual property theory, but neither is successful in creating practical limits.  This is 
because Locke’s provisos do not adapt to intellectual property theory: intellectual 
products never spoil, and the common is never depleted.  If limits are a necessary 
part of Lockean intellectual property theory, then those limits must be found else-
where. 
The state of nature does not provide reasonable limits that apply to copyright.  This 
is a problem, since limits are intuitively good for society.  But this problem has a 
solution.  Locke says, “Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconven-
iences of the State of Nature.”60  So if the state of nature does not provide reason-
able limits on intellectual property, then civil society can legislate to remedy that 
inconvenience. 
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Civil society is itself limited in that it can only legislate for the good of society.  
“The good of society” means both good for society as a whole and also good for 
individuals within society.  This view accords with Locke’s dual concern for public 
and private rights.  Locke states that the “Legislative constituted by [society], can 
never be suppos’d to extend farther than the common good; but is obliged to secure 
every one’s Property.”61  Society’s positive laws should govern for the common 
good while at the same time securing individual property rights. 
There are two ways of harnessing Lockean principles to limit intellectual property.  
First, one could endeavour to develop a complete list of specific Lockean limits.  
This requires consideration of a vast array of limits and their place within a 
Lockean civil society.  This approach has its advantages.  By increasing the work 
on the theoretical end, it reduces the amount of necessary deliberation on any given 
issue.  It eliminates the need to go back to Locke’s texts in that one could merely 
look at the list of Lockean limits.   
But it is unlikely that one could ever produce anything approaching an exhaustive 
list.  Intellectual property, by its nature, is constantly being redefined.  Imagine a set 
of Lockean limits that an intellectual property theorist might have developed one 
hundred years ago.  The list would probably be useful in many respects, providing 
guidelines for the amount of material that one could quote from a book, for exam-
ple.  There are, however, some important contemporary issues that the century-old 
list would not address.  How much material can a musician “sample” from another 
musician’s recording?62  It is doubtful that anyone writing a century ago would have 
anticipated such a question.  Similarly if one were to compose a list of limits today, 
that list would likely be insufficient for dealing with advancements in intellectual 
products.  The list would quickly require some supplemental theoretical work. 
The second option for creating Lockean limits is to outline a normative framework 
for limits, rather than cataloguing them all.  This requires consideration of 
fundamental Lockean concerns and how they might be used to evaluate potential 
limits on intellectual property.  This would not produce a list of specific limits but 
instead a tool for deliberation.  Ideally, judges and legislators would use the 
Lockean normative framework to adapt the law to the needs of society as intellec-
tual property evolves. 
This has the advantage of being adaptable to the changing world of intellectual 
property.  As new intellectual products give rise to new questions, the normative 
framework provides the context for new Lockean answers.  In this way, it avoids 
the problems that riddle the first option.  What is more, the first option’s list re-
quires a normative framework as society advances.  Each problem that the list could 
not solve would necessitate consideration of the theoretical foundations for the 
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Lockean limits on the list.  So while the normative framework is viable over time, 
the exhaustive list becomes dependent on the normative framework behind it.  As a 
result, the normative framework is what the intellectual property theorist should 
concern himself with. 
The normative framework for Lockean limits is Locke’s dual concern for public 
and private rights.  When considering the extent to which a given property right 
should be limited, one should determine the extent to which such a limit would 
enhance or diminish public and private rights.  This does not seem to be a very 
specific normative framework.  But what it lacks in specificity, it makes up for in 
adaptability.  Lockean limits can be tailored to the needs of particular societies, and 
different societies may develop different limits.  Whether a society’s limits on 
intellectual property are Lockean depend on whether the limits are the result of 
balancing public and private rights.  
The example of copyright expiration can help to explain how lawmakers could 
utilize the Lockean normative framework.  To determine whether copyrights should 
expire, one must consider the rights of both the individual and society.  On the one 
hand, the intellectual labourer has a right to copyright protection.  On the other 
hand, the public should not be perpetually excluded from a given intellectual prod-
uct.  It is in the individual’s interest to have the copyright last as long as possible, 
but it is in the public’s interest to gain unrestricted access to the intellectual product 
as quickly as possible.  The best solution would be one that best balances the pri-
vate copyright and the public access.  Or, put another way, it is the solution that 
acknowledges what is best for society and its members.  The Lockean balance 
would mandate expiration after a reasonable period of time because the public’s 
right to access an intellectual product should not be hindered forever.  The specific 
copyright term might depend on the product, but in all cases, the best balance calls 
for eventual expiration.  Therefore Lockean intellectual property theory allows for 
at least expiration as a limit on intellectual property rights. 
Going through a long list of how the Lockean normative framework would apply to 
different kinds of limits would be both tedious and counterproductive.  There are 
too many potential limits to consider.  But more importantly, the point of the nor-
mative framework is not to give a completed list of Lockean limits, but instead to 
provide the means for deliberation. Any attempt to enumerate all the limits that 
should be placed on intellectual property rights would be appropriate only for a 
given society at a given time. Any attempt at enumerating all the limits that should 
be placed on intellectual property rights would be appropriate only for a given 
society at a given time.  Understanding what the Lockean framework is and how it 
might be applied is much more important than predicting all possible intellectual 
property disputes and resolving them before they occur. 
The specific Lockean limits on intellectual property that should be enacted by civil 
society are not as significant as the normative guidelines for creating such limits.  
And Locke provides those guidelines by simultaneously embracing public and 
private rights.  Lockean limits in intellectual property would be limits that take both 
private and public interests into account.  They would not overly limit private 
rights, for the purpose of individuals entering into society is to ensure the protection 
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of their individual rights.  But at the same time, a Lockean approach to intellectual 
property would not grant private rights that are so strong as to do significant harm 
to society as a whole because society must legislate for the public good.  Lockean 
limits would balance public and private rights by granting sufficiently strong pri-
vate intellectual property rights while maintaining a robust public intellectual com-
mon. 
This Lockean approach to copyright is removed by a few steps from Locke’s prop-
erty theory, which provokes the question: what makes it Lockean?  Or, more gener-
ally, what makes any intellectual property theory Lockean?  The most obvious 
answer—that this copyright theory is Lockean in that it draws from Locke’s work—
is not very satisfying.  Many approaches, even some that directly contradict funda-
mental Lockean concerns, could meet this standard.  The best answers lies in those 
fundamental Lockean concerns.  Minimally, a Lockean approach to intellectual 
property would need to adhere to the basic tenets of Locke’s property theory: initial 
common ownership, labour-desert appropriation, and limits on appropriation. Be-
yond that, a theory is more aptly termed Lockean if it embraces Locke’s dual con-
cern for the individual’s property rights and the good of society.  Since my 
approach both adheres to the basic tenets and embraces Locke’s dual concern, it is 
appropriately called a Lockean copyright theory. 
VI CONCLUSION 
In section IV, I constructed a Lockean approach to intellectual property theory that 
left room for fair use.  In this section, I will explain how fair use fits into that theo-
retical space and what implications a Lockean approach to copyright has for intel-
lectual property law. 
The limits of Lockean rights in intellectual property are determined by considering 
both the public rights and private rights.  Any limit on individual rights must be 
created only with society in mind, and any limit on public rights must be done for 
the individuals within society. 
Lockean intellectual property can allow for fair use, provided that a given society 
agrees that fair use is good for society.  Decisions such as this one, under a Lockean 
framework, are not to be made by the intellectual property theorist.  Since fair use is 
a doctrine of civil society, it is up to society to decide.  But there can be a place for 
fair use within a Lockean approach to intellectual property, and the normative 
guideline for determining whether fair use should be part of intellectual property 
law is the private/public fulcrum of rights that emerges out of Locke’s dual concern 
for the individual and society. 
McGowan says that one of the most attractive aspects of a Lockean approach to 
intellectual property theory is that “it cannot be criticized for making predictions 
that might not be true.”63  What he means is that Lockean intellectual property 
theory does not tend to solve every problem, and it dodges criticism by not attempt-
                                                            
63
 McGowan, supra note 2, at 68. 
 232   DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 10 NO 1 
 
ing to solve the harder ones.  He is right in one way, but wrong in another.  Lockean 
intellectual property theory does not solve the hard problems, but it does provide 
the method for solution.  Adopting a Lockean approach means justifying society’s 
ability to consider for itself what is best for its public and private needs.  Different 
societies may come to different decisions.  What matters is that society is a political 
structure built on mutual consent wherein constituents actively participate in creat-
ing, or at least validating through acceptance, their laws.  If fair use is good for 
society, then fair use has a place within Lockean intellectual property theory. 
We value fair use.  As such, any intellectual property theory that precludes fair use 
is unacceptable. Lockean intellectual property theory, despite criticisms, leaves 
room for fair use.  We need only consider whether fair use appropriately balances 
public and private rights in our society. Lockean theory also leaves ample delibera-
tive space. It is adaptable to the changing needs of societies as they develop.  The 
key to any conundrum within a Lockean context is the balance of rights: if a given 
solution simultaneously respects private and public rights, then it is a viable one.  
Lockean intellectual property theory provides enough answers to be worth putting 
into practice, while not providing so many answers that it becomes over deter-
mined. 
 
